For instance, after reading through all the thirty submissio the ones that you'll read here-I noted discrepancies between w seem to expect from effective personal writing for scholarly publ ers apparently believe that being asked to write the personal-whet tive, experiential, affective, and/or embodied piece-frees them fro of writing for readers. As a result, some ignore what I consider ne stance, if not a "thesis," at least a predominant (if not explicitly st as a cogent and coherent arrangement of text, even if that text mented reflections on a unifying concept. Some scholars-and n from the demands of professional academic writing, demands such as making new knowledge of relevance to English studies communities and/or applying existing knowledge(s) and/or theorizing rather than simply relating personal knowledge, regardless of how clever the description.
What I think of as personal writing for an academic audience is simply not that "free." College English readers in particular, steeped in great literature and/or effective rhetoric and expert at evaluating others' essays, may become more impatient with wordy, unfocused, mundane, or irrelevant personal accounts than with academic ones. In addition, regardless of their genre, personal writers must at least consider the focused concerns of College English referees' traditional concerns (articulated on the standard referee questionnaire), such as whether or not the subject will be of general interest to readers of College English, whether previous and current scholarship on the topic is acknowledged, how likely other authors might be to cite the submission, and how readily nonspecialists will understand the article. In other words, like all professional writing, and as my opening reference to O'Donnell's "Politics and Ordinary Language" explains, personal writing must be shaped by "the conditions of language and its users"; it cannot be properly "placed" in the academic unless it's social, that is, constructed for readers in the context in which it is to be received. Referees' rejections of much of my own personal writing have sufficiently persuaded me of that fact.
Another point about what I learned as I read submissions for this issue: I prefer personal writing that's "personal," that stages the author grappling with his or her own self-construction(s). Many others-Min-Zhan Lu comes most readily to mindattend to our "need to imagine ways of using experience critically" ("Reading" 2 39) as we instruct students how to write their difference and learn ourselves how to read through our own difference and evaluate their work justly, effectively. I, however, am concerned with how to attend to that need in our own scholarly writing as well as in our positions as readers of our colleagues'.
As a result, this issue focuses primarily on embodied personal writing, a scholarly concern of mine for quite some time now. In efforts to identify and argue for a powerful alternative to masculinist discourse, my specific call has been to incorporate an "embodied rhetoric" into our professional discursive practices. Generally speaking, embodied rhetoric "requires gestures to the material practices of the professional group and to the quotidian circumstances of the individual writer," such as the writer's affect, motive(s), history, and/or stakes in the argument or position adopted ("Writing" 103) . These unfamiliar, "personal" gestures replace or supplement conventional gestures to an always-already-constituted disciplinary authority, familiar moves such as citing a rigidly surveilled and highly specialized body of disciplinary knowledge; resolving contradictions within or between disciplinary positions; determining the nature and/or tradition of a discipline and whom it should include; or applying or testing a disciplinary theory. Bizzell claims that such an alternative is appropriate not just to feminist research methods and discourses but to all scholarly work in rhetoric and composition. Andrea Lunsford's "Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of Textual Ownership" similarly implores feminists to "create, enact, and promote alternative forms of agency" (53 5). Likewise, feminist scholar and editor Lynn Worsham, in her explorations of the role of l'ecriturefeminine in composition studies and in her call for compositionists to construct a "rhetoric of theory," considers the need for more affective, material professional discourse(s) and method(s). Worsham explains that not just social space and knowledge fields but even "what we take to be the most private and personal of phenomena-emotion and the body-are effects of social organization and are made available for public administration through the techniques of discipline"; thus, she continues, in order "to understand the discipline that has evolved to study and teach writing, we must understand the way it works at both the semantic and affective levels to produce and organize knowledge and experience" ("On the Rhetoric of Theory" 397).
It would seem to go without saying that these calls for and responses to an evergrowing expansion in the conventions of the academic essay-in professionals' critical literacy-require similar expansion in the conventions for scholarly consumption of academic texts. But say it I must, for despite the discipline's growing acceptance of such alternative discourse(s), many if not most academic readers remain committed to conventional professional practices of reading. Historically, scholars have submitted to the discipline's view of the self and affect as unauthorized subjects; we've been trained to see authors' revelations of their personal stories or emotions as selfindulgent at worst, irrelevant at best. Thus, many scholars object-sometimes strenuously-to proposals that academics use "the personal"-an individual's affect and/or narrative and/or experience-as a way to renounce mastery and share a common discourse.
Consider, for instance, former CCC editorJoseph Harris's contribution to Publishing in Rhetoric and Composition, a collection that J. Hillis Miller calls "the best book I know on how to publish scholarship in rhetoric and composition" (xi) and whose jacket promises essays from "contributors [who] are current or past editors of the discipline's most prestigious scholarly journals [and who] undoubtedly have their finger on the pulse of composition's most current scholarship." In his chapter "Person, Position, Style," Harris distinguishes among "three competing aspects of the personal"; he particularly disparages the aspect identified as personal "content,"
namely "the relaying of autobiographical information about the person writing" (48), claiming that we should "raise some questions about the rumored subversive effects of autobiography" at least in part because "most uses of autobiography in scholarly work are in fact quite predictable" (50). Also questionable, he says, is Richard Miller's belief that the reason scholars react "nervously" to an autobiographical move is that it requires them to respond to an author's presence rather than an author's mastery.
Harris declares that there's "an economic as well as psychological aspect" (51) to scholars' nervous response and concludes that "there seems something peculiar about downplaying a sense of'mastery' through calling attention to one's self" (52).
As you have perhaps already predicted, this dissonance between current calls for a more material, affective discourse and a competing commitment to conventional reading habits presents a crucial ethical dilemma in our professional discursive practice: we argue for innovations in our professional writing but remain faithful to conventional logics, gestures, and epistemologies in our reading. In Ethical Dilemmas in Feminist Research Gesa Kirsch helps us recognize some consequences of this ethical dilemma when she explains that "those interested in ethical inquiry must realize that our task is not simply to do research and to publish it, but also to cultivate audiences that can be moved to action by it" (100). Nonetheless, in further considering the politics of publication, she retracts what she calls her earlier "enthusiasm for new textual practices in composition" and says this: "I want to step back and scrutinize my enthusiasm, to articulate some of my reservations [such as] the matter of readability, and the questions of access and utility that attend any act of rhetorical innovation" (69). Feminists' new textual practices, Kirsch concludes, involve "demanding, time-consuming tasks which ask readers to carry out much of the interpretive and analytical work usually done by authors [...] . This is an unusually hard burden for readers to bear, one for which readers expect a significant reward" (72).
That certainly seems true. And it's likewise true that some authors use "the personal" to reveal intimate details of their lives not readily or even tangentially relevant to professional work; to be cloyingly flip or trendy or hip; to satisfy their longing to write creative nonfiction without much academic purpose. Who can really blame readers for being nervous about or disappointed in such writing? I too found it "peculiar" if and when authors submitting pieces for this special issue ignored the needs of College English readers.
But the rhetoric that Kirsch uses-"readers expect a significant reward"-gives me pause. When Kirsch analyzes readers' needs in economic terms and assumes this economy to be-if not natural-at least beyond reproach, she disempowers feminist authors by charging them with the full burden of "greater interpretive responsibility" for their construction of texts that challenge traditional publication practices (66). In this analysis, Kirsch aligns herself-probably unwittingly-with the same economy of textual consumption that Harris advocates when he claims that "the briskness, clarity, and self-effacement of classic academic prose can be seen not simThoughts on Reading "the Personal" 13 ply as a surrender to the logic of patriarchy but also as a kind of deference, as a desire not to impose too much on one's readers" (51). In his view, it's not surprisingcertainly not unethical-if academic readers angrily reject the efforts of an author who "flouts this customary deference and asks the audience instead to attend to his own feelings or experiences," for "it is the reader who has usually paid to attend an academic conference or subscribe to a journal" or-in the currency of sweat equity-to review a manuscript (51). Harris concludes that "there is an economic as well as psychological aspect to this discomfort and anger-that one wants to get what one has paid for" (51).
I read Harris's conclusion as a skewed, narrow, and patrician view of what our textual economy should be. For one, it fails to consider that not just the reader(s) but also the speakers/authors have paid to attend the conference or write for the journal.
(Indeed those roles are often filled by the very same individuals.) Second, it assumes that how Harris wants to spend his money is how we all do. Most important, it projects an institutionalized, and therefore most certainly masculinist, ethics and epistemology. Such androcentrism misrecognizes its demand for a feminist author's deference to the authority of an academic reader unwilling to be held accountable for the interpretive authority constructed by his professional practices.
If we want to commit to a literacy that ends oppression, then perhaps we should be willing to extend ourselves enough to shop more wisely. Perhaps we need to look carefully at our procedures of discourse, the economy driving our discursive practices. Foucault has carefully demonstrated the ways that the author-function "results from a complex operation whose purpose is to construct the rational entity we call an author" and that what we designate as characteristics of the author "are projections, in terms always more or less psychological, of our way of handling the texts: in the comparisons we make, the traits we extract as pertinent, the continuities we assign, or the exclusions we practice" (127). I'd say that expecting "customary deference" is one such practice. What I'm asking us to do instead is to recognize that accountability for discursive practices comprises an academic professional's ethical and interpretive responsibility. This responsibility is not just to feminist theory and method, but to any system grounded in equitable, open-minded exchange.
Here, then, is my first move toward a discursive ethics of professional critical literacy, namely the recognition that our textual economy-the procedures that determine our discursive practices as academics-includes consumption as well as production of our professional texts. At this point in our revisionary view of professional discourse, I want us to consider the ethical dimensions of the economy we're endorsing, particularly the payoffs we expect as well as the assumption that our expectations are (or even should be) similar. (I readily include myself in this "we," since, until now, my scholarly contributions have been most focused on how to write, on how to produce, an embodied rhetoric rather than on how to read it.) We as a pro-fession have not yet paid enough attention to our practices of consuming the alternative discourse(s) that we too-not just our students-produce; as a result, our practices undermine, if not censure, innovative textual production, disciplining their subversive potential.
Lunsford and Ede note this phenomenon in their "Writing Back" response to the "Exploring Discontinuities" section of Feminism and Composition Studies:
What significance (if any) should we (or other readers) attach to the fact that your essays tend to accept and embody, rather than to transgress, the conventions of traditional academic prose? Does this acceptance and embodiment mark a place of paradox and difficulty or does it represent a judicious response to your specific rhetorical situations [.. .] ? (318) The significance I can attach to the phenomenon Lunsford and Ede note is this: if we want to support not just theories but practices that challenge traditional academic prose, then we need to address the ethical imperative for a professional critical literacy that demands that readers, as well as writers, be accountable for the to promoting what Royster identifies as "codes of behavior that can sustain more concretely notions of honor, respect, and good manners across boundaries" ("When" 33). In order to enact a discursive ethics, academic professionals must attend to all Thoughts on Reading "the Personal" 15 aspects of their experience (thoughts, feelings, memories, or associations) when they grade, review, or otherwise consume texts. In other words, readers must learn to embody their responses as individuals and as professionals. Such embodied reading demands recognizing and being accountable for our often invisible commitment to the professional practice of a particular choice as interpreters and to the oppressive potential that choice has on writers of difference.
This brings me to my second important move toward revising our conventional textual economy, namely offering a few suggestions for developing embodied professional reading practices that sanction a critical, self-reflective awareness of the emotional and ideological origins of our textual interpretations. Though my suggestions are rooted in Royster's and Krista Ratcliffe's outlines for better listening practices, they are also in large part cut from the same cloth as the "recovery writing" I've earlier proposed ("Making Writing Matter"). The fact that my proposals for embodied, ethical reading and writing practices differ little signals the strength of the textual economy they construct: interpretive responsibility is shared and thus insists on collaboration, relationship, between readers and writers.
Not surprisingly, then, one essential of an ethical professional critical literacy would be a willingness to read and respond in order to empower, rather than have power over, the writer. This willingness is crucial, "for embodied writing and reading require me to surrender my analytical need to be right and/or absolute in my understanding of how language [and life] works" ("Making" 101). That surrender reveals the need for another logic, one not based on noncontradiction or supremacy, and a reconception of our purpose as professional readers. In the role of negotiator, Royster tells us, we need to determine our "rhetorical purpose to be to cross, or at least to straddle boundaries with the intent of shedding light" ("When" 34); thus, a discursive ethic demands-especially when we're responding to an author of discourse(s) and/or experience(s) opposing our own or invoking intense affect-that we be "curious enough to try to understand [his or her] voice" ("When" 36).
Royster pointedly asks us, "How do we demonstrate that we honor and respect the person talking and what the person is saying?" (38). I see an answer in Ratcliffe's "Rhetorical Listening" and its conception of a new logic of understanding. Unlike the divided logos of traditional "disciplinary and cultural biases [, ...] the logos that speaks but does not listen," Ratcliffe tells us, a more feminist conception of logos is "based on a desire for an intersubjective receptivity, not mastery, and on a simultaneous recognition of similarities and differences, not merely one or the other" (202, 205) .
In addition to feminist reading practices that seek to empower authors, another crucial element of embodied reading is relentless self-reflection; the self-reflexivity of an ethical textual economy demands that I continually call attention to the ways I use rhetoric to position myself in relation to texts and authors and to the motives I have for doing so. that the classic style of academic prose "can be seen not simply as a surrender to the logic of patriarchy but also as a kind of deference, as a desire not to impose too much on one's readers" (51); "Yeah, but you're not the only paying customer!" I responded to his claim that "one wants to get what one has paid for" (51); near the conclusion, I fairly shouted, "You assume that the 'job to be done' is the one you see, you want to be done, the one you want to invest in. What about the rest of us?" As you can probably see, I was reacting to what I read as Harris's attitude (whatever that means), his persona; it seemed so "typically" masculine, one voice assuming authority for This is the third (or is it the fourth?) time that I-as a feminist arguingfor personal criticism-have contested in print Harris's "person" claims in that article.
Apparently, I feel compelled to prove him wrong. Fortunately for me, then, the conventions of academic discourse sanction (I could even say "require") my gesture toward another author's "flaw" and my subsequent correction of it. Being disciplined to rely on such gestures so that my own academic prose will be published and my profession(al position) secure, I've learned a composing process whose invention comes about by constructing others' fault(s). Thus, I made a valuable discovery when I first read that article, or perhaps it's more accurate to say that I've mastered it, made it valuable (to me) by reading it the way I have. In fact, it might even be fair to say that I've been self-indulgent in insisting on the article's relevance so many times, that my first or even second challenge was okay but thereafter I've been beating that proverbial horse. Though I could, perhaps, have justified my insistent critique of Harris's view of personal writing by referring to its inclusion in a volume intended to shape novice professionals' writing styles and/or to his power to shape the discipline's discourse when he served as editor of CCC, I think it a safe bet that the "briskness, clarity, and self-effacement of classic academic prose" have-up till now- we should all commit to a certain discursive ethics; however, I haven't (totally) obscured my personal motives or myself by using "one" instead of "I," by masking my preference for a certain type of personal writing in an attempt to legislate all types.
This focus on rhetoricity is as crucial to embodied reading as it is to embodied Thoughts on Reading "the Personal" 19 writing. Combined, the two provide a discursive ethics of professional critical literacy that empower the goals, politics, and textual economy of difference. As I've said of embodied writing, ethical professional reading requires me to engage rather than ignore problems of interpretation and meaning. It grants me powers of analysis while pressing me to reflect on how my knowledge, affect, and taste are produced by the specific social locations which define me [...] . The discursive tools of recovery writing [and of ethical reading are] crucial to recognizing myself personally and professionally as part of a larger social network, as well as (or sometimes rather than) an individual target of an individual enemy. Embodied writing [and reading have] helped me see that it is in the gaps of the contradictory positions and emotions where I can learn the most, [for] it is in the interplay of my attempts to mediate those contradictions that I can best become aware of those sometimes invisible ideologies that discipline me and those social institutions which construct me. I'm sure that I am not alone in my yearning to answer Royster's incisive call for us to "construct paradigms that permit us to engage in better practices in crossboundary discourse, whether we are teaching, researching, writing, or talking with Others, whoever those Others happen to be" ("When the First Voice" 37-38). Since our reading(s) of their texts is clearly a means of "talking with Others," I ask us to acknowledge the ramifications of our practices as textual consumers, to be accountable to people as well as ideas and to one another as much as if not more than to an abstract "body of knowledge." A discursive ethics that requires me to evoke my beliefs at their most invisible embodied place, to scrutinize relentlessly the stakes in maintaining those individual beliefs and confront the privileges they afford me, and to stage self-consciously my methods for persuading you of the authority of those beliefs-that kind of reading and interpreting will contribute, I believe, to an economy of discourse that is ethical. In that economy, readers' and writers' "significant re- 
